Threat Model
Actors, capabilities, assets, and mitigations framing Velaris’s security and privacy posture.
Assets
- User funds and signer keys (self-custody).
- Trade intent meta-data (pairs, sizes, timing, IPs).
- Coordinator availability and integrity.
- Router program integrity and receipts.
Actors & Capabilities
| Actor | Capabilities | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Passive network observer | Timing, destination IPs, coarse sizes | Mitigated by session isolation and jitter |
| Active MEV searcher | Front/back‑run on-chain flows | Slippage bounds; RFQ firm TTL; batching |
| Malicious maker | Quote manipulation, DoS | Auth, rate limits, reputation, TTL enforcement |
| Compromised client | Exfil of local meta-data | Limited by sign‑only settlement |
STRIDE Mapping
| STRIDE | Vector | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|
| Spoofing | Fake maker identity | mTLS/API keys, signed quotes, allowlist |
| Tampering | Quote/plan alteration | Ed25519 signatures, integrity checks |
| Repudiation | Dispute on fills | Receipts with hashes and blocktime |
| Information disclosure | Timing linkage | Jitter windows, batching, slicing |
| Denial of service | RFQ spam | Rate limits, per‑IP quotas, backpressure |
| Elevation of privilege | Router misuse | Strict account metas, access controls |
Residual Risk
Privacy mechanisms reduce trivial linkage but cannot eliminate all correlation on a public chain. Residual risks include on‑chain statistical inference and cross‑venue correlation. These are communicated to users during profile selection.